Petion's Republic and the Haitian People

La République de Pétion et le peuple haïtien by Hénock Trouillot is important to read when considering Trouillot as a historian of early Haiti. Juxtaposed with his study of the government of Henri Christophe, Trouillot establishes, quite convincingly, how the model of a modern state was more likely to be achieved under the northern king than the republican government in the South and West. Unlike Christophe, whose state was more successful at maintaining large-scale plantation production and ensuring the state possessed significant reserves, the southern republic was cash-strapped, lawless or crime-filled in the capital, notably corrupt, and delivered the economy of the country into the hands of foreign merchants. Christophe's state, which inherited some of the the practices of Toussaint Louverture and the Dessalinien Empire, was more successful at protecting national commerce and industry and was, if given the time, more likely to lead to a stronger state.

Unfortunately, Petion's republic became the model for Haiti after the reunification under President Boyer. Even though Boyer himself had to repudiate or distance himself from some of his predecessor's actions, the mold was already cast. Thus, the regular abuse of power by the executive against the legislative branch and Petion's intervention in the courts was inherited by subsequent presidents. In addition, the incompetence of Petion during his war with Christophe helped ensure the fall of General Lamarre. Deficits, corruption, mishandling of government revenues, and politicians or functionaries cheating the state were regular affairs that sadly plague Haiti to this day. Even Petion himself encouraged the production of counterfeit Haitian currency as his administration looked the other way as Pigny, the director of the Hotel de la Monnaie, enriched himself by printing extra cash and the government accepted counterfeit money at a percentage of its value. 

Petion's republic embraced liberalism to detrimental consequences, too. For instance, his republic weakened national commerce by ending many of the protections of Dessalines and the state's role in commerce, ultimately favoring foreign merchants with access to capital, credit and international markets. Some examples of foreign merchants who enriched themselves during this time included the Frenchman Frederic Martin, who violated laws and received special treatment due to his friendship and partnership with the Bonnets. These foreign merchants often sold on credit to detaillants, who were often women (wives or mistresses of prominent Haitian functionaries or military leaders) who then resold imported goods to petite marchandes from their boutiques. This system, however, led to greater dependence on foreigners (French, English, German and American) who had access to credit, capital, and wielded a great influence on the commerce of the nation. Even attempts to protect local commerce often fell short since those in the upper echelons of the republic's administration were often landowners with an interest in grand commerce that entailed partnerships with these important merchants. These same individuals, including the president were willing to look the other way when foreigners violated laws that restricted their activities. 

Even on the land question, an area in which Petion is sometimes praised for recognizing the merits of small-scale proprietorship, the reality was quite different. According to Trouillot, he actually sold or made concessions to land to upper ranks of the military while saving the best lands for high-level functionaries or himself. However, the lack of capital, absence of technicians and loss or destruction of machinery during the Haitian Revolution meant that the land was often parceled or resold multiple times. This was the beginning of the de moitie system since those who held property needed some system in which labor could be found to produce something for export or national markets. However, it was not necessarily the intent of the president to provide land directly to the cultivateurs on a large scale, nor was his government able to protect them from the abuses of the corvee system or even from beatings by their employer. Indeed, even soldiers were sometimes forced to work on lands owned by their superior officers! What often occurred was a type of serfdom for the cultivateurs, especially when landowners were high-ranking functionaries or military generals with the means to abuse the corvee system or their power to exploit the cultivateurs who received little or no pay or medical benefits from their de moitie contracts. 

What about the population of Haiti? Sadly, Trouillot's sources did not allow him to delve deeply into this matter. However, Petion was, through demagogy, a popular ruler. He regularly gave alms to the poor during national celebrations and, perhaps due to his fears of sparking disturbances because of the color question, he went out of his way to treat noirs well (or at least that's what some sources suggest). Nonetheless, despite his popularity, popular discontent and hostility directed against the French was palpable. Disorder, theft, and anti-French violence in Port-au-Prince were common enough to spark fears among some of the foreign merchant colonies in the capital. Likewise, even the dance societies (tied to Carnaval?) which included titles like president, king, queen and general for their leadership sparked fears of political disorder and revolts. The fact that the government expressed fears of the masses i the city and the ongoing revolt of Goman in the South was never defeated by Petion suggest the masses reacted to Petion with overt and covert resistance. The crimes targeting the goods of foreign merchants and the French, for instance, were undoubtedly a reflection of the populace's anti-French sentiments and fear of a European takeover or invasion. Similarly, Goman's state lasting so long in the Sud showed the appeal of his movement to people in that region as well as its ability to establish a functional community with agricultural exports to Christophe and abroad to furnish itself with weapons and ammunitions. Whether or not a noir had tried to assassinate right before Petion's death is unclear, but the fears of the French that a massacre of the "mulattoes" or themselves was possible in the transition to Boyer's government definitely points to the republic's instability and weakness. Petion, in short, failed to establish stable institutions while encouraging the state against nation paradigm so expertly elucidated by Trouillot's nephew. 

L'administration de Jacmel en 1845

Maurice Lubin's L'administration de Jacmel en 1845 is too brief to truly provide an idea of Jacmel in the 1840s, but it certainly helps. Relying on surviving government documents and reports on receiving and expenditures of the arrondissement's administration, Lubin's short publication does suggest something of Jacmel's importance in Haiti at the time. For instance, Jacmel's revenue stream included about the equivalent of 6 million in foreign currency that was sent to the central administration in Port-au-Prince. Jacmel was also frequently visited by foreign ships in 1845, including two from Venezuela. The city's military received about 52 percent of expenses, with only one single primary school funded by the government. This sorry state of affairs, including the existence of only military hospitals and no government spending on health and sanitation, demonstrates the negative impact of Haiti's overly militarized administration. Indeed, the state could not even pay respectable salaries to some of the citizens who served in the armed forces yet died in indigence and their families could not cover the costs of their funerals. So, while there was prosperity from Jacmel's coffee economy and, perhaps, the cost of living was not yet so high, the government was still spending perhaps excessively in the military. This was so even after the final recognition of Haitian independence by France, though the Western powers could still have invaded the island, necessitating a strong military.

Les anciennes sucreries coloniales et le marché haïtien (sous Boyer)

Les anciennes sucreries coloniales et le marché haïtien (sous Boyer) by Hénock Trouillot is a short read on an interesting moment that consolidated Haiti's banana republic path. As the title indicates, Trouillot's work explores the decline of Haitian sugar production during the presidency of President Boyuer. Trouillot elucidates this process through a combination of archival sources, foreign reports and accounts and newspapers to demonstrate how the lack of capital, absence of labor and poor economic policies led to Haiti's poverty and underdevelopment. 

First, the decline of the sugar industry. Despite attempts to revive Haiti's sugar production and commercial exports and promote the national industry, through initiatives like the Code Rural and immigration of African Africans, Boyer's Haiti failed on all fronts. A lack of capital plagued Haitian sucreries and the Haitian elite generally, meaning that they did not possess the capital to modernize or improve production or hire skilled workers. This favored the guildives and distilleries instead of sugar, since owners of sucreries were able to turn to producing tafia and rum for the Haitian market. According to Trouillot, this ultimately did not do much for the economy or Haitian social elevation since it favored a disproportionate consumption of alcohol. Boyer's government also helped ruin the sugar industry through tax policies that favored imported liquors and imported sugar. So, despite the Boyer government's purported interest in promoting sugar production, the government ultimately contributed to its demise. The lack of credit or limited amount of credit available to Haitians was an additional burden. 

The remainder of Trouillot's short study focuses on market, fiscal and economic policies of the Boyer years. Plans for a national bank under President Boyer did not succeed while foreigners began to overwhelmingly dominate the national economy. Although, at least on paper, prevented from owning land and, legally, limited to consignment, many of these foreigners (French, Germans, British and Americans) violated Haitian laws and regulations repeatedly. The seeds of frequent foreign involvement in Haitian coups and revolutions can already be seen in the example of Robert Sutherland, who sold arms to both Christophe and Petion during their conflicts. In other ways, the access of foreigners to capital and credit from their home countries and their ability to flout Haitian laws or find willing Haitian allies facilitated their dominance of the economy. In short, most imported goods were under their control and many were able to force or undercut Haitian competitors. Able to set prices that were ultimately passed on to the consumer, these foreigners contributed little to Haiti. Their economic importance for the state, however, could be seen in the data for years available in which recettes from imports paid by foreign consignment merchants, although contraband, speculation and overcharging ensured them a sizable profit in Haiti. Members of the Haitian government and the Haitian elite accommodated themselves to this pattern, using the state and their position or ownership of some land to benefit themselves to whatever extent possible. While some lamented the weakness of national commerce and the lack of economic power for the Haitian elite, they engaged in truly anti-national business or political actions. 

Surprisingly, Trouillot attributes the demise of the Boyer years to opposition from the very same corrupt Haitian elite that was responsible for favoring the stranglehold of foreigners on Haiti's commerce. Some of these familiar names appeared in L'Union in the 1830s and included landowning elite families, such as the Nau. These groups, joined by those in the South by 1843, succeeded in overthrowing Boyer in a movement that received popular support. For Trouillot, these anti-Boyer elites were ravenous and wanted to take advantage of the state for their own economic benefit rather than truly aim for liberal reforms of the economy or policies more favorable to the development of a national bourgeoisie. While this aspect of Trouillot's argument probably requires more evidence, it is interesting to see the way he highlighted the frequent fires that broke out in Port-au-Prince that targeted commercial houses, perhaps an indication of popular discontent and resentment of the foreign-dominated economy and the state that established this. Of course, the 1825 agreement to indemnify France for recognition and the formation of the "double debt" contributed to this downward path for Haiti, which became even more fully enmeshed in the economic imperialism of the Western powers.